“When war and revolution come, remember the long years in which the storm was rising, and don’t blame the thunderbolt”.
That warning appeared in the Chicago Tribune in November 24, 1895. It was written by Clarence Darrow (lead image, left), then a young city lawyer working for railroads and also for unions in the years which followed the bitter, violent battles for limited work hours and higher wages. The Chicago union struggle initiated the May Day strike for protest and celebration between 1881 and 1886.
Today the US is one of the few countries in the world not to recognize the holiday, moving “Labour Day” from the spring to the fall to erase the history. Darrow (1857-1938) was to become the greatest courtroom lawyer in American history; today he is almost forgotten. He remains one of my three American heroes (the others are Ted Hall and Muhammad Ali).
It was recently discovered that President Donald Trump’s group of warmakers against Iran are so corrupt that they are placing lucrative wagers on US military attacks, the targets and timing of which they know in advance because they are deciding them and have seen the top-secret orders.
Russians tracking the evidence of this corruption on Polymarket, a New York-based crypto bookmaker, can operationalize the data they collect on the insider betting in order to defend against the attacks, or bet their own money, or both.
The Americans are making more money, however, than the Russians. President Vladimir Putin’s runner and betting broker, Kirill Dmitriev, has so far failed to win a single wager on the corruption of his Washington counterparts, Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Also, Dmitriev’s (and the President’s) betting pattern is so predictable that its failure is worth betting on; the timing and the targets Dmitriev frames for bettors in his daily tweet stream.
In war, predictability of this kind is weakness. In betting, predictability is an asset for the bettors but only if the bookmakers and oddsmakers don’t have access to the secrets.
Polymarket is an investment speculation and betting operation of a Jewish entrepreneur in Manhattan named Shayne Coplan; he claims to have a current capital valuation of $9 billion. Donald Trump Jr. is an investor in Polymarket and advisor to Coplan.
Polymarket’s trading turnover has jumped from $9 billion for the year of 2024 to almost $26 billion in the month of March 2026. It hit a record daily volume of $425 million on February 28, the day the US and Israel launched the new war against Iran. Since then an estimated $2 billion has been bet through Polymarket and other bookmakers on this war.
This is how Americans in the Trump regime can be defeated in war but make money at the same time.
The bigger profit for Trump, however, is in betting on the valuation of Polymarket if and when its shares are listed on a US exchange and a new market capitalization formed. In two years, that capital value target has gone from $350 million to $15 billion. For Trump and these bettors the time is running out – two years to the presidential succession election in which Donald Trump Jr is a candidate, but only six months to the Congressional election which threatens an impeachment majority aimed at the criminality of the Trump regime.
And what is the biggest no-loss wager Trump, Coplan, and their co-investors can run before then? That’s the day and time when Israel launches nuclear weapons against Iran.
In the new podcast with Jamarl Thomas, we spell out the evidence of the unreadiness of Putin and his advisors – Yury Ushakov, Kirill Dmitriev, Elvira Nabiullina, and the Russian oligarchs – to defend Iran and deter the Americans from their war plans. Part of this unreadiness is psycho-strategic – it’s called Putin’s Kursk Syndrome
View or listen to the podcast and the word-by-word analysis of what Putin told Trump in their telephone conversation on April 29. This is the Kursk Syndrome in action. It’s so predictable you can bet on it. Podcast live: starts at -1:25:00 and runs to -20:28:00. An edited video version will follow shortly at this link.
To understand President Vladimir Putin’s recent public statements on the Russian economy, the Tuapse refinery fire, and security controls for the internet, the question is – does he believe what all Russians know to be obviously misstated and mistaken? Does Putin understand he is discrediting himself with Russian voters as the national parliamentary election campaign gets under way?
The voter evidence is plain to see in both the VTsIOM’s April report and in the Levada Centre tracking chart (lead image, right). VTsIOM is a state polling agency, the Russian (until 1992 All-Union) Public Opinion Research Centre; Levada is an independent group of Russian sociologists, based in Moscow and currently under state sanction as a foreign agent for having received US funding in the past.
According to VTsIOM’s daily tracking poll of trust in the country’s political leaders, Putin’s approval rating has dropped from 81% in mid-December to 71% this month. This has not (repeat not) been accompanied by an increase in voter trust in the four parliamentary opposition figures, led by the Communist Party’s Gennady Zyuganov.
This downward line in the polls reflects the loss of confidence which Putin himself has triggered; it isn’t a response by voters to alternatives proposed by Putin’s critics in the opposition parties.
According to the March 18-26 survey by Levada — conducted by face-to-face interviews with a random sample of voters in their homes across the country – “six out of ten respondents negatively assess the current political situation in Russia – 61% (including 52% considering it tense, and 9% critical, explosive), the share of such respondents has increased by 9 percentage points since May 2025. A third of the respondents look positively at the political situation in the country (including 27% talking about it as calm, 9% as prosperous). But since May 2025 their share has decreased by 10 percentage points…”
“More often than others, the political situation in Russia is assessed as tense, critical, or explosive by women (70%); those aged from 40 to 54; the less well-off (65% — 67% among those with barely enough for food); residents of cities with a population of 100,000 to 500,000 (68%); entrepreneurs (71%); those who believe that things in the country are on the wrong track (89%); and those who do not approve the performance of the incumbent president.”.
In Putin’s public speech to a session of his economic ministers and advisors, including Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina, on April 15, the President acknowledged the obvious: “Statistics show that economic growth has, unfortunately, been slowing for two consecutive months. Overall, GDP contracted by 1.8 percent between January and February. Manufacturing and industrial production as a whole have suffered losses, as has construction, a strategically important sector.”
He then told voters not to blame him.
“Yes, experts point to calendar effects, weather conditions, and seasonal factors as the reasons for this negative performance. As I mentioned at our last meeting, we are fully aware that in January this year there were two fewer working days than last year, and in February, one fewer. These are, of course, objective circumstances, but it is clear that they are far from the only factors shaping business and investment activity in the country.”
Regarding the Tuapse refinery fire in the Krasnodar krai, the Ukrainian drone attacks began on April 16. Putin did not begin to address the public on what was happening until twelve days later, on April 28. In the mid-afternoon the Kremlin announced that “the President received a report from the Emergencies Minister on fire situation in Tuapse following Ukrainian drone strikes.” This report came by telephone from the Emergencies Minister, Alexander Kurenkov, who was calling from his office in Moscow. It was then announced that “in accordance with Presidential instructions, in the next few hours, Alexander Kurenkov will head off to Tuapse to personally oversee firefighting operations at the affected oil refinery and the elimination of consequences of the incident.”
Thinking to reassure voters who for several days had been watching dramatic television and social media reports of the extent of the fire, the acid rainfall, and the oil pollution in Tuapse, Putin said he was sending a subordinate but wouldn’t be going to Tuapse himself. He was remaining in Moscow to meet his health minister, the President of Congo, and visit an emergencies clinic in Moscow.
Putin was also recorded at a Kremlin meeting for “ensuring election security” as saying: “Drone strikes against civilian infrastructure are also becoming more frequent. A recent example is the attack on energy facilities in Tuapse that could potentially cause grave environmental challenges. The governor has just reported – he is there on the ground or was there a couple of hours ago – adding that there don’t seem to be major threats and the people are coping with the challenges they are facing.”
At the same time Putin made an election pitch at Russian businessmen, blaming the recession on Russia’s foreign enemies. “The Russian economy has for many years already been operating under serious external challenges. This includes a difficult economic environment, illegitimate sanctions, and a number of other adverse circumstances. You know well that in relation to many of our entrepreneurs and members of their families – and not even immediate family members, sometimes in the third generation – these very illegitimate sanctions are imposed. The same is being done in relation to entire major companies. At the same time, the overwhelming majority, practically all entrepreneurs, work effectively and with full dedication, take a patriotic position, sincerely strive to make their contribution to achieving Russia’s development goals, help our fighters at the front, and support participants in the special military operation and their family members. The state also needs to work in partnership with business, ensuring its lawful rights and interests.”
The widespread Russian voter reaction to Putin’s remarks was reported by Oleg Tsarev, a leading figure in the Ukrainian opposition to the Kiev regime and an exile in Crimea: “It is very important that the president is given objective and truthful information. Now we know that Tuapse will be all right There are no serious threats. Sad irony.”
Tsarev’s irony is a political understatement. It’s sad for Russians to see and hear because the President appears not to understand the damage he is publicly inflicting on his own credibility.
So the question they are now asking is whether Putin is once again showing the loss of understanding of how his statements, actions, and inaction are understood in the country. Again: this refers to the sinking of the Kursk submarine on August 12, 2000, and Putin’s delay at the time, his refusal to acknowledge the obvious while he vacationed at the seaside, and his reluctance to meet and hear out his critics, face to face.
When Putin did meet the Kursk’s crew’s families at Vidayevo, the Kremlin reported the six hours in four lines. What happened in fact was hostile questioning, bitter scepticism of Putin’s replies, and anger at the official cover-up. Putin, then just eight months into his presidential term, directed his ire at domestic reporters who broke through naval base security to interview the crew’s families.
For public reaction at the time, and Putin’s subsequent recovery in voter polls, read this. For a discussion of Putin’s Kursk syndrome, view or listen to the new podcast with Martin Sieff and Pelle Neroth Taylor, recorded at 3 on Wednesday afternoon, Moscow time.
There is a 2,500-year old message about who is strong, who is weak in politics and war, and what the latter can do to defend themselves from the former.
The message comes from Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War. Written between five and ten years after the events described, which occurred in 416 BC, it was part of a negotiation between the invading Athenian forces and the Melos islanders, who wanted to remain neutral in the war between Athens and Sparta. The message was part of the Athenian refusal to accept this neutrality and the Athenian ultimatum – either the Melians surrendered, or they would be killed. The Melians refused; the Athenians then killed all the men, enslaved the women and surviving children; and repopulated the island with Athenians.
This is the message: “The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they must.”
The second, consequential sentence is the most famous of lines still quoted from Thucydides. The weak will have to submit to the strong — that was the warning. Do what we want or we will kill you. Almost never quoted and forgotten, however, is the first, conditional sentence.
That ancient condition is still the modern calculation. If the weak can devise enough power to resist, to undermine the power to compel, to make the strong uncertain of the outcome of their threats and displays of force — if their defeat and death can be credibly threatened in retaliation, then the strong can be deterred.
In just this way, the “equality of power” can be upset. Neither justice in the outcome, nor the history of the war to achieve it, will always be dictated by the strong. Exaggerating your strength if you think you are strong, and over-estimating the weakness of your adversary can cost you defeat, maybe your life.
This is where the regime of President Donald Trump is today as he dictates terms to Iran.
President Vladimir Putin told Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at their meeting on Monday in St Petersburg: “We see how courageously and heroically the Iranian people are fighting for their independence and sovereignty… For our part, we will do everything that meets your interests.” This appeared to be an unqualified declaration of Russia’s support for Iran to resist Trump’s terms.
Unqualified, however, it is not. At least not on Putin’s part. His spokesman and advisor on foreign policy, Yury Ushakov, Russian ambassador to the US between 1998 and 2008, issued the qualifier: “We will analyze what he [Araghchi] will say, and analyze against the background of today’s conversation the signals that we have received from both the Americans and the Israelis. And then we’ll see what to do.” In other words, Putin will balance Iran the defender against the US and Israel the attacker. Putin will measure their respective strengths and then choose which side to take in the fight.
April 25, ANZAC Day, is a national celebration in Australia commemorating the World War 1 campaign, ordered by Winston Churchill in London, for Australian and New Zealand (NZ) forces to land at Gallipoli, and attempt to march on the Ottoman Empire capital at Istanbul.
It has become the equivalent of Memorial Day in the US, which comes a month later. Like the American commemoration, for Australians and New Zealanders it is now meant to celebrate all the wars they have fought. Very recently, the ceremonies include a “Welcome to Country” speech by a tribal elder of the Australian indigenous peoples. They were not allowed to serve in the Australian forces until the numbers of willing whites were beginning to run low in 1917.
ANZAC stood for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. That wasn’t a combination of armies of two independent states. It was a single unit of two colonial divisions formed in December 1914 and commanded by a British general, William Birdwood, with his staff of officers from the British Indian Army.
This was an empire operation: Australia was a self-governing dominion of British colonies in 1901; New Zealand the same in 1907. However, they remained under British constitutional, legal, military, and secret service control until the Japanese Army forced the surrender of the British at Singapore in 1942 and headed southward.
Japan did more for Australian and New Zealand independence than the anti-imperialism of Australians and New Zealanders. By contrast, the Indians, fifteen thousand of whom were landed with the Anzacs, successfully fought the British to achieve their independence in 1947; Australia and New Zealand followed with legislation of 1986 and 1983, respectively. By then, however, CIA penetration of both ruling elites had succeeded in replacing the overt British Empire with a subvert US Empire. And so it is today, with a Zionist twist.
The 1915 ANZAC operation was a total failure, ending in ignominious retreat.
Not only did the Turks drive the Allies off with one of the gravest campaign tolls of the war; estimated numbers of dead and wounded were almost 350,000 – slightly more than half on the Allied side. The Turks then began the genocide of the Armenian population, killing more than 1.5 million civilians; they followed that with attacks on the Greeks.
The Australian casualty rate was about 15% dead; the comparable NZ death rate was 19%; the Indian casualty rate, 10%; the British rate (including Irish and Newfoundlanders) was 12%.
The Turkish retelling of the history omits that the principal forces which defended the heights and took the greatest casualties were conscripted Arabs from Syria and Iraq and Kurds from Mosul. Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk), then commander of the Ottoman 19th Division at the front, held his Turkish infantry and cavalry in reserve to defend the northward road to Istanbul. The death rate for these Arab soldiers was at least 27%, probably higher.
Since 1996, and with government authorization since 2006, descendants of the Ottomans who fought and defeated the Australians have been allowed to march alongside the Australian veterans through the Australian cities. Note that in the state press corporation report of 2006, these soldiers are described as “Turkish”, not as Arabs.
Australia is now permanently at war with the Arabs and Muslims with a Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, appointed from the Jewish community by the federal government to represent the opinions of 120,000 Australian Jews in an attack on the opinions of 815,000 Australian Muslims. Together with a Royal Commission currently under way to recommend criminalizing the second group’s defence against the first, Australia is adopting the ideology of race-hate fascism to advance its domestic, intercommunal warmaking and its foreign warmaking (against Russia, China, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc.).
The combination of personal sanctions and asset seizures against the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska (lead image), corporate sanctions against his Rusal and EN+ companies, and the cutoff of alumina feedstock supplies from Australia and the Ukraine have done visible damage to Rusal’s Hong Kong-listed share price (lead image).
At the pre-Ukraine war peak of 2021, the market capitalization of Rusal was HK$115 billion (US$14.8 billion); the share price ran up to HK$8.50. But then as the Special Military Operation began and sanctions and asset confiscations escalated, this collapsed to just HK$48 billion (US$6.2 billion) in December 2024. By this April, however, share price recovery has lifted Rusal’s market cap to HK$66 billion ($US8.4 billion); the share is now at HK$4.31.
First listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in January 2010, Rusal’s share price has never reached its initial public offering (IPO) price of HK$10.80; that price was rigged by Deripaska with insiders who included Nathaniel Rothschild, John Paulson, and the Russian state bank VEB. (they sold out swiftly and richly within the first year). At its 2021 high, the share price reached just over HK$8.00.
The published annual financial statements of the company show that net profit was $3.2 billion in 2021. It then began falling year by year – to $1.8 billion in 2022; $282 million in 2023; $803 million in 2024; and finally to a loss of $455 million in 2025.
Since February of this year, however, the US war against Iran, and Iran’s counterattack against the Hormuz Strait and the aluminium-producing Arab states from which the US have launched their attacks, have begun to dig Deripaska’s company out of its loss-making hole.
In the Stone Ages, as President Donald Trump (lead image) calls ancient history, it was expected that if a man wanted somebody enough, he would grab them by the short hairs to make them scream their compliance.
The Stone Age painters’ records on cave walls, which have been discovered to date, disclose more of the anatomical details of the animals and women the men hunted, and of their weapons, than they do of the hunters.
After several million years of that history had improved fighting and killing technology with metal and horses, Homer came along to polish the character of the hunters and put a shine on the original idea that brute force almost always succeeds unless it is met with matching brute force. He also introduced the idea that the gods are always on the side of the war winners, and that the theological reward they offer is sexual satisfaction following on slaughter (and vice versa). If Trump and his speech and tweet writers had read enough, they would be citing Homer for their model.
But it won’t help them. In fighting a war as hackneyed Homeric as Trump’s against Iran (China, Russia, Venezuela, Cuba), the predictability of his every move exposes him to defeat by an adversary who can predict, and is unpredictable himself. That adversary understands that Trump has Achilles’ heels all over his body.
In this new podcast with Nima Alkhorshid, we go through the details of the fighting around the Strait of Hormuz, explaining why this is the lynchpin of all the Iranian end-of-war conditions – Iranian control is the only effective guarantee that the US (and Israel) will be deterred from resuming the war; the toll is the only method of securing multi-billion dollar reparations for the war damage; by strangling the economies of the West it is more effective for revenge and regime decapitation than those the CIA and Mossad have been able to use.
These were the end-of-war aims of Mojtaba Khamenei’s speech of March 26. “The leverage of closing the Strait of Hormuz must definitely continue to be utilised”, he said then. And so it continues through the Jalali Five Points of April 1; and the Ghalibaf Ten Points of April 19.
Breaking news was added as we spoke of Trump’s closeting in lengthy White House “executive time” and “policy meetings” on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday; then the new US Navy interception and boarding of the oil tanker Tifani in the Indian Ocean, between Sri Lanka and Singapore. A day later, on Thursday afternoon, the abrupt sacking by Trump and his War Secretary, Peter Hegseth, of Navy Secretary John Phelan reveals that the US military resistance to Trump is beginning to spill outside the White House with grave political risk for Trump and the Republicans as the election campaign enters the final stage. .
Testimony from the survivors of the Iranian frigate, IRIS Dena, attacked and sunk in a US Navy operation, led by the submarine USS Charlotte on March 4, has just been released in Iran, broadcast by an Iranian television outlet (lead images, top and bottom, are screenshots, bottom image is a file photo).
The two survivors who appear in the six-minute videoclip are the captain of the Dena, Commander Abuzar Zarri (top left), and accompanying him is the first officer of the Dena, who is not identified by name (top, second image, centre). Zarri has been wounded; at the end of the video he appears to be standing with the support of a crutch. Zarri had previously been reported as having been killed in the attack.
Photographed in India when the Dena was participating in the Indian Navy-hosted MILAN 2026 review and exercise, Zarri was the second senior Iranian officer in India. The ranking officer was Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, Commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, who flew back to Teheran when the Dena, and its two escorts, IRIS Lavan and IRIS Bushehr, departed Visakhapatnam port on February 25. Their visit had lasted for ten days, February 15-25. Photographs of Zarri at Visakhapatnam match his appearance in the new video, which was released on April 21.
The evidence provided by the two officers indicates the Mouj-class warship did not have its regular armament of anti-ship and anti-air missiles, and torpedoes for anti-submarine combat. This was a condition of the Indian invitation for the exercise. The US Navy, which also participated in MILAN 2026, not only knew this but US air-patrol electronic surveillance of the Dena in the days before it reached Visakhapatnam on February 15 confirmed this disarmament.
“One of the exercise’s conditions,” Zarri said, “was weapons like missiles and torpedoes, which are strategic weapons, shouldn’t be carried by the participating vessels”. The Indian Navy set the condition and the verification procedure when the Dena entered Visakhapatnam. Asked if “the destroyer [sic] was not armed at all”, Zarri replied: “No, we didn’t have torpedoes.” He was not excluding the Dena’s six deck guns.
During the approach to the Dena, on its attack run, the USS Charlotte command knew the Dena was disarmed.
Zarri also reveals that two US torpedoes were fired. The first has been reported in the US media as having missed the Dena. In fact, according to Zarri, the first torpedo struck the ship, “and we lost our mobility. The ship’s shaft and propeller were destroyed so we had no mobility at all…we suffered no fatalities.”
Zarri said the local time was 3:35 am. At 5:06 am, US and other reports indicate the Dena was hit in the aft section with a large explosion breaking the keel. This evidence of a 90-minute interval between the torpedo firings is new and has not been explained. If confirmed, it indicates that after its first strike, the Charlotte asked for orders from its base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, the US Pacific Fleet, and the Pentagon. The time in Washington, DC, was between 4 and 5 in the afternoon of March 3.
In that interval, the testimony of the Dena’s first officer indicates that Zarri ordered the crew to assemble on the aft deck and prepare for evacuation, surrender, scuttling, or other options which have not been revealed by Zarri; return of fire was impossible without sub-surface torpedoes. “The second torpedo killed 104 of our friends, our comrades, our dear brothers,” Zarri added, confirming he knew “that was their intention.”
“After the first shot,” the second officer said, “I sent the crew to the flight deck [lead image, bottom] and went back inside to check that everyone was out…I went back in, started checking from the stern to midship to make sure that no one was left inside. I came back up toward the stern. I was in the corridor when the second torpedo was fired.”
Dawn in the waters off Galle, western Sri Lanka, the location of the Dena on the morning of the attack, did not occur until 5:59 am. Although it was still dark, however, the Charlotte captain, Commander Thomas Futch, and his weapons officer, were able to verify that the Dena crew had assembled on the rear deck. In the customary laws of naval warfare, if the attacking captain can verify that the target crew is readying to abandon ship, and is not preparing counter-fire, it is unlawful for him to fire to kill. Futch also knew the Indian Navy had guaranteed that the Dena was not carrying anti-submarine torpedoes.
The second torpedo fired by the Charlotte, according to Zarri, “was meant to cause heavy loss of life”. The second US torpedo was aimed at the aft section of the Dena’s keel underneath the assembled crew.
The newly disclosed survivor evidence does not reveal the Dena’s course south and then westward after leaving Visakhapatnam on February 25 with orders to seek sanctuary from the expected US attack at a Sri Lankan port or an Indian port. Zarri said that “on the way home we received a message that the US had attacked our country and that we’re at war.”
While that message was dated February 28, Indian and Sri Lankan sources indicate that in anticipation of the attack, the Iranians had been requesting safe haven for the Dena and its escorts from Sri Lanka from before February 25, and then from India on or before February 28. From the departure from Visakhapatnam, more than four days elapsed before the Indian agreement was issued to open Kochi port to the three-ship squadron on March 1.
A report from an Indian source reveals that the Iranian ships had “called at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and then spent over eight days [February 25-March 4] in international waters.” This has not been acknowledged by Sri Lankan or Indian officials.
However, it was their delay – under intense pressure from US officials to disallow safe haven or to stall it – which exposed the Dena to the ambush the US was preparing. Knowing that the Dena was disarmed on the Indian Navy’s request and that the US Navy was in hot, armed pursuit, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jayshankar, together with the Sri Lankan President Anura Dissanayake, were responsible for the delay which was fatal.
Their subsequent statements disclaiming culpable knowledge and concealing the Dena’s course at sea between February 25 and March 4 add to the evidence of their complicity in the American war crime.
When journalism reports decision-making and action-taking in Teheran, Beijing, Moscow, and Washington — one after another in time sequence — the differences, the corrections, the contradictions, and the ambiguities of meaning between them are bound to be confusing to observers reading the record of outcomes without inside knowledge.
Confusion, however, isn’t what is happening in each of those capitals. It’s politics, faction-fighting in the middle of war in which deception and propaganda are also weapons of war.
Investigative journalism ought to be making this clear – in each of the warfighting capitals, as well as between them on the battlefields.
Podcasting, however, is viewed by many to be a spectator sport in which the only worthwhile conclusion after time, overtime and penalty shoot-out, is the score on the board for balls kicked into the net – without the line umpire blowing his offside whistle. There’s no cheering for defence played so well that the score is a nil-nil draw.
One of the differences between match scores and the politics of the wars the Trump Administration is fighting against Iran, Russia, and China is the harmlessness of the first and the lethal destruction of the second. One of the features they have in common is that you can wager money on the outcomes. Big money, if you have inside influence on the decision-making and knowledge of what will be decided – as Trump himself, his friends, and his officials have. Unless you have placed a Draw-No-Bet wager and get your money back, a nil-nil result usually means you’ve lost. Trump only bets on winning, never on a draw.
In the new podcast with Dimitri Lascaris, aired at 12 noon Moscow and Athens time, we look carefully at the evidence on the battlefield at the Strait of Hormuz and look at Trump’s form for bluff and deception. The latest statements of China’s Foreign Ministry – live at 3 pm Beijing time – are analyzed for what is said, and not said. The same method is then applied to the performance in Moscow. The conclusions aren’t recommended for team fans, bettors or bookmakers. But click if you are an intelligence agent.
This is not a question. Asking it is the answer.This is because the Security Council, the politburo of Russian war and security policymaking which President Vladimir Putin leads but does not fully control, rarely issues public statements; it never issues one like the announcement of April 14.
